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OVERVIEW 
This paper discusses the basics of e-discovery from a Minnesota 
perspective. It is divided into seven sections, beginning in Part I 
with an introduction that addresses why knowledge of the issues 
surrounding e-discovery is important. Part II addresses what is 
discoverable and must be preserved. Part III addresses the types of 
sanctions that can be imposed for e-discovery misconduct and the 
types of misconduct generating those sanctions. Part IV addresses 
3
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the concept of proportionality and Part V addresses cooperation. 
Part VI focuses on competent representation on e-discovery 
matters; and lastly, Part VII addresses malpractice issues. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While the Information Age arrived more than forty years ago, 
and “data compilations” have been discoverable since the 1970 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a significant 
portion of the bar is still on the learning curve to understanding 
how to handle electronically stored information (ESI) in litigation 
or investigation. The purpose of this article is to help demystify the 
subject for Minnesota practitioners. It is also the goal of the groups 
comprising the Minnesota E-Discovery Working Group, through 
this primer and other related articles, to establish a set of best 
practices for handling ESI. 
The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, in particular 
Rule 1.1, require that all practitioners have the requisite legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation to undertake the 
representation.1 Since virtually every document today is an 
e-document, or generated through the use of an electronic system, 
the knowledge required by Rule 1.1 includes knowledge about how 
to handle ESI. 
Three fundamental points serve as a gateway to understanding 
the challenges of ESI. First, ESI has characteristics that differ from 
paper documents in several important respects. These differences 
include: vastly greater volumes of information, which are easily 
transmitted (increasingly on mobile devices); information 
maintained on systems that dynamically update or modify the 
information; and increased costs and logistical challenges 
associated with accessing and exporting relevant information.2 
Second, technologies that generate information are ubiquitous 
and constantly changing, so it is imperative to continually refine 
and update one’s understanding. It is no longer assumed to be 
 
 1.  MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012). 
 2.  See generally THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 2–5 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2007) (listing volume and duplicability; persistence; dynamic, changeable content; 
metadata; environment-dependence and obsolescence; and dispersion and 
searchability). 
4
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enough to collect e-mail from a few custodians. We must now 
endeavor to create active data maps that identify the systems most 
likely to hold relevant data. Technology continues to evolve to meet 
these changing systems. 
Third, because virtually all information is now electronically 
generated, a lawyer must either acquire sufficient knowledge of ESI 
issues and practices, or retain the requisite talent if one is to fulfill 
his or her ethical obligation to represent clients competently. Thus, 
it is essential for all attorneys to have a basic understanding of 
electronic discovery and the need to engage technical electronic 
discovery experts when appropriate.3 
As courts began to decide ESI cases, there were undoubtedly 
instances of bad facts making for bad law. However, as the judiciary 
has gained experience and understanding, several basic principles 
have emerged and gained currency not only in individual court 
precedents, but also in pilot rules projects.4 For example, it is now 
widely recognized that a party’s obligations in discovery do not 
extend to producing every shred of potential evidence. Rather, 
leading cases and respected commentators alike emphasize that 
electronic discovery requires reasonableness and good faith, just as 
is the case with paper document discovery.5 Nevertheless, as 
technology continues to evolve, what is actually recoverable and 
therefore potentially discoverable also continues to evolve. The 
ease with which digital information may be altered, destroyed, and 
 
 3.  See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20 ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 105A (REVISED) 3 (2012), available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120808 
_revised_resolution_105a_as_amended.authcheckdam.pdf (revising Comment [6] 
to Rule 1.1 on Competence to state that “a lawyer should keep abreast of changes 
in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant 
technology” (emphasis added)). 
 4.  See Press Release, S.D.N.Y. Office of the Dist. Court Exec., SDNY 
Implements Innovative Pilot Program to Improve the Quality of Judicial Case 
Management in Complex Civil Cases (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.nysd.uscourts 
.gov/file/news/complex_civil_case_pilot; [Model] Order Regarding E-Discovery in 
Patent Cases, E.D. TEX., http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin2/view_document.cgi 
?document=22218 (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (clean version of the Model Order). 
 5.  See Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, 285 F.R.D. 331, 335–36 (E.D. Pa. 2012); 
Rimkus Consulting Grp. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 632 n.30 (S.D. Tex. 
2010); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 28. 
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hidden has given rise to the need for courts to demand that data be 
preserved, identified, and produced. What this means in practice is 
that courts will be less likely to tolerate either “any and all” requests 
for information or boilerplate objections to production requests.6 
In aid of this rule of reason, the courts and the bench-bar 
groups promulgating local rules and standards have reinvigorated 
the proportionality standards that have been in the rules since 
1983.7 Accordingly, courts will become more sensitive to (and 
resist) requests that a party do everything possible to locate 
potentially relevant information, especially if the cost of complying 
with the request is disproportionate to the potential benefit.8 
Another critically important principle that has emerged is that 
because some information storage systems are dynamic, and ESI 
may be lost through the systems’ normal operation, the location 
and identification of ESI should be addressed early in a case. Both 
federal and many states’ rules (including Minnesota’s) require that 
counsel be prepared to discuss ESI issues during an early “meet-
and-confer” session with opposing counsel, as well as with the court 
or supervising agency.9 Moreover, in accord with the foregoing, the 
discovery rules and the courts also expect parties to discuss ESI 
issues with a level of transparency sometimes missing in the earlier 
days of paper discovery. Indeed, judicial reactions to “hide the ball” 
and delay tactics appear as root causes for the overwhelming 
majority of the harsher sanctions that have been awarded in 
electronic discovery cases.10 Thus, it is now well established that 
 
 6.  See infra Part V (discussing Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 
F.R.D. 354, 358–59 (D. Md. 2008), and characterizing boilerplate objections as 
“an obvious violation” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 7.  See, e.g., Default Standard for Discovery, Including Discovery of Electronically 
Stored Information (“ESI”), D. DEL., http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files 
/Chambers/SLR/Misc/EDiscov.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (discussing 
cooperation and proportionality); [Proposed] Standing Order Relating to the Discovery 
of Electronically Stored Information, SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT 
PROGRAM, http://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/StandingOrde8_10 
.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (emphasizing proportionality, cooperation and 
early meet and confers). 
 8.  See generally The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on 
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 155 (2013) (explaining the 
proportionality rule requirements). 
 9.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06(d). 
 10.  See Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 364–65; Steven S. Gensler, A Bull’s-Eye View of 
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courts view cooperation between the parties as a key component to 
any litigation.11 
A final principle that is fundamental to sound resolution of 
ESI issues is that all discovery is bound by relevancy limitations. 
Thus, under the federal rules since 2000,12 unless otherwise 
ordered, parties may obtain information regarding the claims and 
defenses asserted in the action. This rule is narrower than it was 
previously, and the amendment signaled that parties “have no 
entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are 
not already identified in the pleadings.”13 The court may expand 
the scope of discovery “for good cause” to any matter relevant to 
the subject matter in the action.14 Absent such an order or 
modification of the pleadings, however, it would appear reasonable 
to confine discovery (and logically, preservation) to information 
that is potentially relevant under the pleadings. Therefore, as the 
matter continues to evolve, the scope of a litigation hold may need 
to be expanded or contracted to effectively address preservation of 
potentially relevant information.15 
 
Cooperation in Discovery, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 363 (2009); The Sedona Conference, 
The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009). 
The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation has now been endorsed by more 
than 100 judges and has been specifically embraced by Minnesota courts. 
See MINN. SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 35 
(Dec. 2011), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public 
/Court_Information_Office/Civil_Justice_Ref_Task_Force_Dec_2011_Rpt.pdf. 
The Sedona Conference has also published a series of resources on cooperation 
for different constituencies. See, e.g., The Sedona Conference Cooperation Guidance 
for Litigators & In-House Counsel, SEDONA CONF. (Mar. 2011), https:// 
thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/465; The Sedona Conference Cooperation 
Proclamation: Resources for the Judiciary, SEDONA CONF. (public comment version 
Aug. 2011) [hereinafter Resources for the Judiciary], https://thesedonaconference 
.org/download-pub/425. 
 11. See Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div., 255 F.R.D. 350, 
358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 356–58; Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 
of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 WL 3342423, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 
2007). 
 12.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
 13.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment). 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  See, e.g., The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on 
Legal Holds: The Trigger & The Process, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 265, 284 illus. iii (2010). 
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II. WHAT IS DISCOVERABLE (AND MUST BE PRESERVED)? 
The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
sought to address the reality that information is now digital in 
nature and must be addressed in its digital form within the context 
of litigation. As discussed herein, effective July 1, 2013, the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended to also 
address this concept.16 The most significant change in the Federal 
Rules, which addresses the concept of accessibility of digital 
information, is set forth in Rule 26(b)(2). Specifically, Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) provides that “[a] party need not provide discovery of 
electronically stored information from sources that the party 
identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or 
cost.”17 The rule further provides that a party may make a motion to 
compel or for a protective order and that the party opposing 
production must then prove their contention that the information 
is not reasonably accessible due to undue burden or cost.18 The 
court may still order discovery of such information upon a showing 
of good cause.19 In addition, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) further provides 
that the court may limit discovery upon a finding that “the 
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can 
be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive; . . . the party seeking discovery had 
ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the 
action”; or the burden of the discovery outweighs its benefits 
(applying a five-factor test).20 
In Minnesota, the state courts have sought to coordinate their 
approach to e-discovery with that taken by the federal judiciary, and 
the Minnesota discovery rules were amended, effective July 1, 2007, 
to adopt electronic discovery provisions similar to those added to 
the Federal Rules.21 
 
 16.  The relevant sections of the Federal Rules are provided in the appendix 
(as are the changes in the Minnesota Rules). See infra Appendix A. 
 17.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(ii). 
 21.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02. The revised MINN. R. CIV. P. 34.01 provides in 
pertinent part: 
   Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce 
and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on the 
 
8
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To address the continuing evolution of discovery, the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure were amended again, effective 
July 1, 2013, and now more closely follow the federal rules on early 
disclosure. Rule 26.01 now requires initial disclosures by the parties 
within sixty days of the original date when an answer is due. These 
initial disclosures include a description of all documents, including 
those that are electronically stored.22 
Likewise, Rule 26.06(c) requires that the parties develop a 
discovery plan that includes “any issues about disclosure or 
discovery of electronically stored information, including the form 
or forms in which it should be produced.”23 Further, the court may 
direct a conference be held with the judge pursuant to Rule 
26.06(d), which would also include a discussion of any issues 
 
requesting party’s behalf, to inspect and copy, test, or sample any 
designated documents or electronically stored information—
(including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound 
recordings, images, phono records, and other data or data 
compilations stored in any medium from which information can be 
obtained—, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through 
detection devices into reasonably usable form) . . . . 
Likewise, MINN. R. CIV. P. 34.02 provides: 
   The request may, without leave of court, be served upon any party 
with or after service of the summons and complaint. The request shall 
set forth the items to be inspected either by individual item or by 
category, and describe each item and category with reasonable 
particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and 
manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts. The 
request may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored 
information is to be produced. 
 . . . . 
   Unless the parties otherwise agree, or the court otherwise orders: 
(a) A party who produces documents for inspection shall produce 
them as they are kept in the usual course of business at the time of the 
request or, at the option of the producing party, shall organize them to 
correspond with the categories in the request; 
(b) If a request does not specify the form or forms for producing 
electronically stored information, a responding party must produce the 
information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or 
in a form or forms that are reasonably usable; and 
(c) A party need not produce the same electronically stored 
information in more than one form. 
 22.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01. 
 23.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(c). 
9
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relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored 
information.24 
It is important to note that when dealing with electronically 
stored information, perfection is not required. What is required is 
that counsel conducts an early and methodical survey of their 
client’s electronic information systems to enable them to accurately 
assess the ESI available and to ensure its preservation, availability, 
and ultimate collection.25 The methodical survey should be 
conducted early in the representation, performed in a reasonable 
manner, and in good faith, so that counsel may participate 
intelligently in “meet and confer” conferences and thereafter 
address the court in an informed manner concerning electronically 
stored information that is potentially relevant to the claims and 
defenses in the matter.26 
In conducting the initial survey of the client’s electronic 
information systems, counsel should consider many factors, 
including that client’s technological landscape. In considering 
whether or not potentially relevant electronically stored 
information is reasonably accessible and subject to production, 
counsel may consider the approaches described by the Sedona 
commentators.27 
What follows is a diagram illustrating a decision-tree to aid in 







 24.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06(d). 
 25.  See, e.g., Phx. Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 4837 (HB), 
2006 WL 1409413, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006). 
 26.  See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 230 F.R.D. 290, 291–93 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (denying plaintiff’s motion for permission to disclose confidential transcript 
because basis for request was not tied to claims or defenses in case and plaintiff 
had no independent duty to produce it). 
 27.  See The Sedona Conference Commentary on Inactive Information Sources, 
SEDONA CONF. (July 2009), https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/64; 
The Sedona Conference Commentary on: Preservation, Management and Identification of 
Sources of Information That Are Not Reasonably Accessible, SEDONA CONF. (July 2008) 
[hereinafter Commentary on Preservation], https://thesedonaconference.org 
/download-pub/66. 
10
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Figure 1: Decision Tree
28
 
The list of the typical sources of ESI and devices on which it 
may reside continues to evolve rapidly. The routine e-mail sources 
(desktop computer, e-mail servers) have now been joined by a 
plethora of mobile devices (smart phones, tablets, etc.) and the 
document types that are created using these ever-evolving tools for 
creating data and sharing information. It is important to note that 
information currently considered reasonably accessible may not 
 
 28.  Sedona Conference Commentary on Preservation, supra note 27, at 6 fig.1. 
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have been deemed accessible a mere few months prior, and the 
same holds true for information that is not deemed reasonably 
accessible currently. For example, restoration of a standard format 
backup tape was once a complex and expensive endeavor but in 
many situations is now considered routine and significantly less 
expensive. It is important to remember that as technology 
continues to progress at an ever-accelerating pace, the standards 
applied must continuously be assessed and adjusted. 
III. SANCTIONS 
As lawyers continue to struggle with ESI and their obligations 
under the Federal and Minnesota Rules, it is imperative to 
recognize that courts are increasingly refusing to permit parties to 
disregard the rules regarding e-discovery.29 This section first 
addresses some examples of litigation tactics that have resulted in 
sanctions in other jurisdictions and then addresses and describes 
the leading cases on sanctions at both the state and federal level in 
Minnesota. 
A. Examples of Sanctionable Conduct 
The issuance of sanctions as a result of e-discovery misdeeds 
are on the rise and are becoming increasingly common when a 
party chooses to utilize a system of recordkeeping that seeks to 
conceal rather than disclose relevant records, or makes it unduly 
difficult to identify or locate them, rendering a production of 
documents and ESI an excessively burdensome and costly 
expedition. Indeed, as one federal court in Utah noted when 
considering allegations by Dell: “To allow a defendant whose 
business generates massive records to frustrate discovery by 
creating an inadequate filing system, and then claiming undue 
burden, would defeat the purposes of the discovery rules.”30 Thus, it 
 
 29.  Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 437 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)); 
Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 255 F.R.D. 135, 148–50 (D. Del. 2009), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Starbucks Corp. v. ADT Sec. 
Servs., Inc., No. 08-CV-900-JCC, 2009 WL 4730798, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 
2009); Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1193 
(D. Utah 2009). 
 30.  Phillip M. Adams & Assocs. L.L.C, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (quoting 
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appears that the more electronically sophisticated a party is, the less 
leeway it can expect to receive from the court on matters of e-
discovery. 
It is also unwise to exaggerate the difficulty involved in 
retrieving information sought by the opposing party. An example 
of how this tactic can backfire is found in Starbucks Corp. v. ADT 
Security Services, Inc.,31 a case in which the district court noted that a 
defendant’s representative “provided exaggerated reasons and 
exaggerated expenses as to why [the defendant] allegedly cannot 
and should not be ordered to comply with its discovery 
obligations.”32 The Starbucks court found that the plaintiff should 
not be disadvantaged because the defendant, a “sophisticated” 
company, chose not to migrate their e-mails to a much more 
functional archival system, and thus the court determined that the 
e-mails were reasonably accessible and needed to be produced.33 
In addition to tactics intended to make collection and 
production more difficult, or exaggerating the difficulty of 
production, parties must analyze whether potentially relevant ESI is 
in the possession of a third party. If so, special analysis may be 
necessary. For example, if a party has contracted for a cloud-based 
e-mail service, counsel will want to understand how accessible the 
data are, where they are stored, the time involved in the extraction, 
what metadata may be available (if the opponent is seeking 
metadata), and what procedures are available for extracting the 
e-mail. In addition, as cloud computing resources continue to 
expand and become commonplace in the business environment, 
this causes an increase in the difficulty of identifying and isolating 
relevant data. While courts have yet to address spoliation of 
electronic information stored in the cloud, it is likely only a matter 
of time before this relatively new data storage option forms the 
basis for sanctions. 
As noted in Part II above, when dealing with ESI, courts should 
not and generally do not expect perfection, and it is inevitable that 
sometimes relevant information may be lost through the routine 
functions of a computer system.34 On the other hand, when 
 
Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976)). 
 31.  Starbucks Corp., 2009 WL 4730798 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009). 
 32.  Id. at *5. 
 33.  Id. at *6. 
 34.  See, e.g., Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952, 965 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding 
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information is destroyed during litigation through culpable 
conduct (be it through destruction resulting from bad faith, 
intentional conduct, or gross negligence), and the destruction 
results in prejudice to the requesting party, sanctions are likely.35 
When there is a showing of culpable conduct, sanctions may range 
from issuance of an adverse inference to even, in the most 
egregious of cases, terminating sanctions (i.e., dismissal or default 
judgment).36 
Where there is no such showing of culpability or extreme 
prejudice, the court may enter a remedial order that is not 
intended to punish, but rather is intended to correct the imbalance 
that may result from the data spoliation, such as additional 
discovery, cost-shifting, or other remedies. Not surprisingly, if a 
sanction is given, the nature of the sanction is case and fact 
dependent. 
In Pension Committee of University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc 
of America Securities, L.L.C.,37 a district court ordered sanctions 
against the plaintiffs resulting from their negligent and grossly 
negligent failure to properly conduct discovery (including failure 
to institute a proper litigation hold), which resulted in destruction 
of electronic and other records.38 The Pension Committee court 
 
that spoliation sanctions were unwarranted because “CBS’s general policy was to 
reuse tapes” and “[n]othing in the record indicate[d] that CBS intentionally 
destroyed the tape or acted with bad faith or gross negligence in respect to it”); 
Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 41–42 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) 
(holding that spolitation sanctions were not appropriate where Yath provided 
insufficient support to the claim that the browser history and temporary files had 
been intentionally deleted); see also Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 
2012) (holding that the “district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that an adverse inference instruction was inappropriate” due in part to “the 
limited role of the destroyed folders in the promotion process”); Miller v. Lankow, 
801 N.W.2d 120, 129 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that a party with a legitimate need 
to destroy evidence may do so under certain limited circumstances). 
 35.  See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of 
Am. Sec., L.L.C., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin, 685 
F.3d 135; Cenveo Corp. v. S. Graphic Sys., Inc., No. 08-5521 (JRT/AJB), 2010 
WL 3893680, at *15 (D. Minn. June 18, 2010) (awarding $100,000 in sanctions). 
 36.  See In re Hecker, 430 B.R. 189, 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010) (granting 
plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and holding that part of plaintiff’s judgment 
against defendant was not dischargeable). 
 37.  685 F. Supp. 2d 456. 
 38.  Id. at 497. 
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ordered the issuance of an adverse instruction and monetary 
sanctions, required certain specific additional discovery to be 
produced, and explained that “the failure to issue a written 
litigation hold constitutes gross negligence because that failure is 
likely to result in the destruction of relevant information.”39 
Reliance on Pension Committee, however, should be tempered in 
view of the contrary result in Chin v. Port Authority.40 The Chin court 
found that the defendant had failed to implement a document 
retention policy and as a result, a significant number of highly 
relevant documents had been destroyed.41 The plaintiff accordingly 
sought an adverse inference due to spoliation; however, the Chin 
court denied the motion, reasoning that the defendant’s spoliation 
was “negligent, but not grossly so.”42 
Other courts have also emphasized the need for proactive 
preservation.43 The district court in Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc.,44 in 
response to a party’s pattern of lackadaisical discovery practices, 
issued substantial monetary sanctions, civil contempt fees, and 
issued an order requiring the offending party to notify every 
plaintiff in future suits for five years of its past discovery 
transgressions.45 
B. Discussion of Leading Cases 
In Minnesota, deliberate spoliation (substantiated either 
through forensic methods or admission) can result in adverse 
inference instructions and exclusion of evidence.46 For example, 
 
 39.  Id. at 465. 
 40.  685 F.3d at 161–62. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See id. at 143 (finding that failure to implement a litigation hold is not 
gross negligence per se). 
 43.  See Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 441 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Wilson v. Thorn Energy, L.L.C., No. 08 Civ. 9009(FM), 2010 WL 
1712236, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010); Dong Ah Tire & Rubber Co. v. Glasforms, 
Inc., No. C 06-3359 JF (RS), 2008 WL 4298331, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2008); 
Super Future Equities, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A., No. 3: 06-CV-0271-B, 
2008 WL 3261095, at *10–11 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008); In re Intel Corp. 
Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 258 F.R.D. 280, 284–87 (D. Del. 2008). 
 44.  No. 2:07-CV-372 (TJW), 2011 WL 806011 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011). 
 45.  Id. at *10–12. 
 46.  See, e.g., Frazier v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 811 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 
2012). 
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the court in the Minnesota federal bankruptcy case In re Hecker47 
issued a terminating sanction due to the behavior of the defendant 
and his counsel, finding that they acted with a “blatant disregard of 
the Court’s orders and the discovery rules.”48 
Generally, courts will look to impose the minimum sanction 
necessary to restore balance to the parties. By way of example, the 
district court in Cenveo Corp. v. Southern Graphic Systems, Inc.,49 
awarded a party injured by spoliation $100,000 in monetary 
sanctions, rather than issue an adverse instruction.50 
It is important to note that the Eighth Circuit established in 
Morris v. Union Pacific Railroad that a finding of more than mere 
negligence is required before a court issues an adverse inference 
instruction.51 The Morris court found that the severity of the adverse 
inference instruction sanction requires a finding of bad faith based 
on evidence of intent to destroy documents for the purpose of 
suppressing evidence.52 The Eighth Circuit in Morris further 
cautioned against the indiscriminate use of adverse inference 
instructions and held that to justify the issuance of an adverse 
inference instruction there must first be a finding of intentional 
destruction of data “indicating a desire to suppress the truth.”53 In 
so holding, the Eighth Circuit explained that “[t]he adverse 
inference instruction, when not warranted, creates a substantial 
danger of unfair prejudice.”54 
In Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp.,55 the district court ordered 
sanctions in the form of additional discovery as well as cost shifting. 
The Escamilla court found that prejudice was presumed as the 
spoliation resulted in evidence being irretrievably destroyed.56 It is 
notable that the Escamilla court ordered the spoliation sanction 
based upon its inherent disciplinary powers,57 and therefore the 
 
 47.  430 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010). 
 48.  Id. at 195 (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49.  No. 08-5521 (JRT/AJB), 2010 WL 3893680 (D. Minn. June 18, 2010). 
 50.  Id. at *15. 
 51.  Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 900–02 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 52.  Id.; see also Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 460 (8th Cir. 
2013); Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 53.  Morris, 373 F.3d at 901 (quoting Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 746). 
 54.  Id. at 903. 
 55.  No. 09-2120 ADM/JSM, 2011 WL 5025254 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011). 
 56.  Id. at *5. 
 57.  Id. 
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sanction was not predicated upon a finding of bad faith, as found 
in Morris.58 
More recently, in Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley,59 decided in 
2013, the Eighth Circuit has made clear that in order to give an 
adverse inference instruction, the district court must make two 
specific findings: (1) bad faith on the part of the party destroying 
evidence, and (2) prejudice to the other party.60 
In Miller v. Lankow,61 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
established a three-factor test to determine whether an adverse 
inference instruction should be given.62 The court held that the 
three factors to consider are: 
(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or 
destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice 
suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a 
lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the 
opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously 
at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the 
future.63 
In Frazier v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. (BNSF),64 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a district court has 
considerable latitude in the choice of language used in an adverse 
inference instruction. In that case, the district court had stated that 
missing blueprints were an “example” of BSNF’s failure to preserve 
evidence.65 Thus, BNSF argued that this instruction unjustifiably 
expanded the inference that could be drawn beyond just the 
missing blueprints.66 The Frazier court affirmed the district court’s 
denial of a new trial based on the spoliation instruction, noting that 
admissions BSNF’s counsel made indicated that the defendant had 
“bungled evidence, engaged in sloppy evidentiary maintenance and 
preservation, and that there [had] been a clear and convincing 
 
 58.  Morris, 373 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 59.  703 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 60.  Id. at 461. 
 61.  801 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 2011). 
 62.  See id. at 132. 
 63.  Id. (quoting Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 
(3d Cir. 1994)). 
 64.  811 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 2012). 
 65.  Id. at 629. 
 66.  Id. 
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showing of negligence.”67 Thus, the court did not address the 
threshold for issuing an adverse inference instruction, but rather 
only dealt with the considerable latitude of a district court in 
choosing the language to be used in such a jury instruction. 
In dealing with a spoliation sanction issue in another case, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found in Patton v. Newmar Corp.68 that a 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert 
testimony due to the destruction of evidence.69 The Patton court 
cited to the inherent power of the trial court to impose sanctions.70 
Once the expert testimony was excluded, the trial court granted 
summary judgment, and that ruling was affirmed by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.71 
The decision to issue an adverse inference instruction when 
faced with spoliation resulting in significant prejudice to a party is 
within the discretion of the court. Recently in the case Multifeeder 
Technology, Inc. v. British Confectionery Co.,72 the district court 
affirmed the magistrate judge’s finding that spoliation had 
occurred and that the parties had suffered significant prejudice 
resulting therefrom. The district court judge further held that the 
magistrate judge’s ordered sanction of $500,000 was insufficient 
and raised the sanction to $625,000.73 The magistrate judge had 
also ordered the issuance of an adverse inference instruction based 
upon the finding of bad faith.74 However, the district court judge 
did not specifically address that issue in his subsequent ruling. 
At times, the court finds it necessary to issue more severe 
sanctions. In the case of Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct 
Marketing, Inc.,75 the court found that one of the defendants 
(Manley Toys) had failed to obey court orders on numerous 
occasions related to discovery issues. In light of those violations, the 
court not only entered judgment for $362,438 in sanctions, but also 
 
 67.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68.  538 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. 1995). 
 69.  Id. at 119. 
 70.  Id. (citing Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
 71.  Id. at 120. 
 72.  No. 09-1090 (JRT/TNL), 2012 WL 4135848 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2012). 
 73.  See id. at *8–10. 
 74.  Id. at *3. 
 75.  No. 09-1091 (JNE/JSM), 2013 WL 449838 (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2013). 
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ordered a default judgment on certain counts in the complaint.76 
The court went on to hold that Aviva would submit proof of its 
damages, but Manley Toys was not permitted to oppose that 
submission.77 
It remains important to note that not every deletion of 
electronic information will result in sanctions.78 
IV. PROPORTIONALITY 
Courts are endorsing the need for proportionality within the 
discovery and litigation process.79 The Federal Rules also speak 
explicitly on the need for proportionality and establish a five-part 
test.80 Simply stated, discovery requests should be proportional to 
the needs of the case, including the importance of the information 
sought to resolving the dispute, the dollar amount in controversy, 
the resources of the parties, and the importance of the issues at 
stake.81 With the exception of the award of costs per Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) or Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 
54.04, each party bears its own costs of litigation unless there is a 
court order or agreement between counsel regarding cost shifting 
or cost sharing. 
The amended Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, effective 
July 1, 2013, require that factors of proportionality be considered 
with respect to the scope and limits of discovery. Rule 26.02(b) of 
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure identifies the factors to be 
considered when assessing proportionality and provides: 
Discovery must be limited to matters that would enable a 
party to prove or disprove a claim or defense or to 
impeach a witness and must comport with the factors of 
 
 76.  Id. at *1. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See, e.g., Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2011); Yath v. Fairview 
Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 50 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); see also Miller v. Lankow, 
801 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that a party with a legitimate need 
to destroy evidence may do so under certain limited circumstances). 
 79.  Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 364–65 (D. Md. 
2008); see Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 260 F.R.D. 682, 689–90 (N.D. Ga. 2009); 
Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 442387, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 31, 2007). 
 80.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
 81.  The Sedona Conference, supra note 8, at 160. 
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proportionality, including without limitation, the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery weighed against its likely benefit, 
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues.82 
The principles of cost shifting and proportionality arise out of the 
application of, and interplay between, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) and (C) and their corresponding state 
rules applicable to electronic discovery issues and disputes.83 In 
addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g) and Minnesota 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26.07 further underscore the obligation 
that attorneys have to ensure that discovery requests are not 
promulgated solely to harass, unduly delay, or needlessly increase 
the cost of the litigation. These latter provisions also give courts the 
authority to issue sanctions for discovery abuses.84 
Proportionality is a principle that appears to have been 
neglected by litigators until recently when the costs of e-discovery 
have made many wonder, “Is this case worth it?” As earlier stated 
herein, the applicable discovery rules allow courts to place limits on 
discovery according to the proportionality factors specified in the 
rules. In addition, the Sedona Conference developed the following 
“Principles of Proportionality” to increase uniformity in how courts 
make proportionality determinations: 
1. The burdens and costs of preserving of potentially 
relevant information should be weighed against the 
potential value and uniqueness of the information 
when determining the appropriate scope of 
preservation. 
2. Discovery should generally be obtained from the most 
convenient, least burdensome and least expensive 
sources. 
3. Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a 
party’s action or inaction should be weighed against 
that party. 
4. Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in the 
analysis of whether requested discovery is sufficiently 
 
 82.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b) (emphasis added). 
 83.  See e.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b)(2), (3). 
 84.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3); MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.07; Resources for the Judiciary, 
supra note 10, at 35. 
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important to warrant the potential burden or expense 
of its production. 
5. Nonmonetary factors should be considered when 
evaluating the burdens and benefits of discovery. 
6. Technologies to reduce cost and burden should be 
considered in the proportionality analysis.85 
There are few cases discussing the application of 
proportionality principles to discovery matters, which may be a 
reflection of the neglect of the adoption of this principle until the 
Minnesota Rules did so. Recently, in Escamilla, the Federal District 
Court for the District of Minnesota cited proportionality without 
much elaboration as the basis for a cost-shifting determination.86 In 
Escamilla, the plaintiff alleged a hostile working environment, 
constructive discharge, and retaliation.87 She served document 
requests specifically seeking the accused supervisor’s ESI.88 When 
such information was not produced, she filed a motion to compel 
and sought an order requiring the supervisor and the company to 
make the supervisor’s home and work computers available for 
forensic copying.89 
The plaintiff argued that ESI on the computers would show 
that the supervisor had fabricated documents that had been 
produced in paper form during discovery.90 However, one of the 
supervisor’s two home computers had been sent to a relative in 
Mexico.91 Since the start of litigation, the second computer’s 
operating system had been reinstalled and the computer had never 
been searched for relevant evidence on the argument that the 
computer belonged to the supervisor’s wife.92 Unfortunately, the 
company had also failed to search the supervisor’s laptop and a 
later forensic analysis by the company’s forensic analysis vendor 
had not located any relevant documents.93 The plaintiff then 
claimed spoliation of evidence. 
 
 85.  The Sedona Conference, supra note 8, at 157. 
 86.  See Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09–2120 (ADM/JSM), 2011 WL 
5025254, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011). 
 87.  Id. at *1. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at *1–2. 
 90.  Id. at *2. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See id. at *2–3. 
21
Burke et al.: An Electronic Discovery Primer
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
448 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
The magistrate judge in Escamilla was faced with a number of 
discovery issues, including whether to allow the plaintiff’s forensic 
expert to perform his own search of the supervisor’s work laptop 
and his wife’s computer, and whether to allow a second deposition 
of the supervisor after the forensic analysis of the computers.94 The 
magistrate judge granted all three requests and defendants 
objected on the basis of proportionality, specifically arguing that 
the burden and expense of the additional discovery outweighed the 
benefit of the additional deposition and the expert forensic 
analyses of the two computers.95 Upon review of the magistrate 
judge’s order, the district court determined, citing The Sedona 
Conference Commentary on Proportionality in E-Discovery, that the 
supervisor had “self-inflicted” the burden by reinstalling the 
operating system and, therefore, was not entitled to shift the cost of 
restoring and searching the computer’s data.96 
V. COOPERATION 
Cooperation and proportionality go hand in hand and are 
often discussed together. In a more fulsome analysis of the 
proportionality principle in e-discovery, Magistrate Judge Paul 
Grimm, a frequent lecturer and writer on e-discovery issues, wrote a 
lengthy decision expounding on the centrality of cooperation and 
proportionality in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co.97 The 
plaintiff in Mancia had served extensive document requests seeking 
everything related to the relationship between the plaintiffs and the 
defendant.98 The defendant provided boilerplate objections. The 
Mancia court stated that these objections were “an obvious 
violation” of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 33(b)(4), which 
requires that grounds for objecting to discovery requests be stated 
with specificity, or else they are waived.99 The Mancia court then 
 
 94.  Id. at *2. 
 95.  Id. at *3. 
 96.  See id. at *5–6 (citing The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference 
Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289, 298 
(2010)). 
 97.  253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008). 
 98.  Id. at 355–56. 
 99.  Id. at 356. 
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expounded at length on the topics of cooperation and 
proportionality in discovery, explaining: 
One of the most important, but apparently least 
understood or followed, of the discovery rules is Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(g), enacted in 1983. The rule requires that 
every discovery disclosure, request, response or objection 
must be signed by at least one attorney of record, or the 
client, if unrepresented. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). . . . If a 
lawyer or party makes a Rule 26(g) certification that 
violates the rule, without substantial justification, the 
court (on motion, or sua sponte) must impose an 
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay 
reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees, caused by the 
violation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3).100 
In the Mancia decision, Judge Grimm went on to identify several 
rules that should guide the manner in which discovery was to be 
conducted, as well as ensure cooperation. He articulated the rules 
as follows: 
First, the rule is intended to impose an “affirmative duty” 
on counsel to behave responsibly during discovery, and to 
ensure that it is conducted in a way that is consistent “with 
the spirit and purposes” of the discovery rules, which are 
contained in Rules 26 through 37. It cannot seriously be 
disputed that compliance with the “spirit and purposes” of 
these discovery rules requires cooperation by counsel to 
identify and fulfill legitimate discovery needs, yet avoid 
seeking discovery the cost and burden of which is 
disproportionally large to what is at stake in the litigation. 
Counsel cannot “behave responsively” during discovery 
unless they do both, which requires cooperation rather 
than contrariety, communication rather than 
confrontation. 
Second, the rule is intended to curb discovery abuse by 
requiring the court to impose sanctions if it is violated, 
absent “substantial justification,” and those sanctions are 
intended to both penalize the noncompliant lawyer or 
unrepresented client, and to deter others from non-
compliance. As the Advisory Committee’s Notes state, 
“Because of the asserted reluctance to impose sanctions 
 
 100.  Id. at 357; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s notes (1983 
amendment). 
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on attorneys who abuse the discovery rules, Rule 26(g) 
makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose 
appropriate sanctions and requires them to use it. This 
authority derives from Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the 
court’s inherent authority.” 
Third, the rule aspires to eliminate one of the most 
prevalent of all discovery abuses: kneejerk discovery 
requests served without consideration of cost or burden to 
the responding party. . . . The rationalization for this 
behavior is that the party propounding Rule 33 and 34 
discovery does not know enough information to more 
narrowly tailor them, but this would not be so if lawyers 
approached discovery responsibly, as the rule mandates, 
and met and conferred before initiating discovery, and 
simply discussed what the amount in controversy is, and 
how much, what type, and in what sequence, discovery 
should be conducted so that its cost—to all parties—is 
proportional to what is at stake in the litigation.101 
By signing pleadings, counsel agrees to abide by the rules of 
proportionality and cooperation, as the act of signing is meant to 
certify that the pleadings are “neither unreasonable nor unduly 
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior 
discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action.”102 
The Mancia court then reordered the parties to cooperate to 
determine what was “at stake,” i.e., what the maximum amount was 
that the plaintiffs could recover in wages and attorney’s fees.103 With 
this number, the court would then be able to determine the 
“amount in controversy” in order to perform a Rule 26(b)(2)(C) 
proportionality analysis and to “quantify a workable ‘discovery 
budget’ that [was] proportional to what [was] at issue in the 
case.”104 
Courts have explicitly endorsed the doctrine of cooperation 
within discovery. Cooperation is predicated upon both parties 
understanding the relative value of the case as balanced against the 
costs of litigation. With discovery being the single largest expense 
 
 101.  Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 357–58 (citations omitted). 
 102.  Id. at 358 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii)). 
 103.  Id. at 364. 
 104.  Id. 
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within litigation, it is essential that all parties acknowledge the 
importance of undertaking an early consideration of the issues 
involving proportionality.105 One of the jurisdictions in which 
district court judges have been the most prolific in their rulings in 
the area of electronic discovery is the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York.106 In an effort to further 
refine their treatment of electronic discovery issues, the Southern 
District of New York created a framework for the treatment of 
discovery issues.107 
In September 2011, the Federal Circuit Advisory Counsel, led 
by Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Randall Rader, 
adopted a Model Order governing e-discovery in patent cases in 
order to “aid trial courts in the exercise of their discretion in 
crafting orders tailored to the facts and circumstances of each 
case.”108 The Federal Circuit Advisory Council explained that its 
goal was “to promote economic and judicial efficiency by 
streamlining e-discovery, particularly email production, and 
requiring litigants to focus on the proper purpose of discovery—
the gathering of material information—rather than permitting 
unlimited fishing expeditions.”109 Some of the more significant 
provisions of the Model Order include: 
 Limitations on when and how e-mail productions can be 
requested including only after the parties have engaged in 
“core” discovery. 
 
 105.  Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 10, at 18–19. 
 106.  See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of 
Am. Sec., L.L.C., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin v. Port 
Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012); Wilson v. Thorn Energy, L.L.C., No. 08 Civ. 
9009(FM), 2010 WL 1712236 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010); Aguilar v. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement Div., 255 F.R.D. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Veeco 
Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 MD 1695(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 983987 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 107.  See Press Release, S.D.N.Y. Office of the Dist. Court Exec., supra note 4. 
 108.  See Model E-Discovery Order Adopted by the Federal Circuit Advisory Counsel, 
FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2011/model-e-discovery-order-adopted 
-by-the-federal-circuit-advisory-counsel.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). 
 109.  Fed. Circuit Advisory Council, An E-Discovery Model Order, FED. CIRCUIT 2, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/ 
Ediscovery_Model_Order.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). 
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 Presumptive limitations for e-mail production requests, 
including on the number of custodians (up to five), keyword 
search terms for each custodian (up to five), and the relevant 
time frame for culling purposes. 
 Cost shifting to the party requesting disproportionate 
production requests. 
 Limitations on the production of certain metadata in the 
absence of a showing of good cause.110 
Following the lead of the Federal Circuit Advisory Council, in 
February 2012, the Eastern District of Texas amended its local rules 
to include as Appendix P its own Model Order Regarding 
E-Discovery in Patent Cases.111 The Eastern District of Texas’s 
Model Order is a modification of the Federal Circuit Advisory 
Council’s Model Order, and the General Order includes a redline 
strikeout version that depicts and explains the specific changes 
made to the Federal Circuit Advisory Council’s Model Order.112 
Below is a list of some recommended strategies for courts to 
consider in order to encourage the concepts of cooperation and 
proportionality in connection with e-discovery: 
 Direct the parties to discuss proportionality in the meet-and-
confer process and to include in the discovery plan estimates 
of the cost of responding to particular requests for discovery of 
ESI in comparison with the reasonable ranges of outcomes of 
the action. 
 Require attorneys to develop discovery budgets with the 
approval of their clients. 
 Issue scheduling orders with the assistance of counsel (and, as 
appropriate, the parties) that allow only discovery 
proportionate to the reasonable range of outcomes. 
 
 110.  Id. add. at 2–4 (discovery model order). 
 111.  See General Order 12-6: General Order Amending Local Rules, app. at 
15–20 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2012), available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi 
-bin/view_document.cgi?document=22217. 
 112.  See id. app. at 15–19; [Model] Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases, 
supra note 4 (clean version of the Model Order). For a detailed discussion of the 
two Model Orders, see Gilbert Andrew Greene & Daniel Scott Leventhal, Eastern 
District of Texas Addresses E-Discovery in Patent Cases in Local Rules Update, NORTON 
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 Limit e-discovery in the first instance to ESI that can be 
produced by least expensive means and that is most likely to 
produce relevant information. 
 Use the judicial management strategies described above to 
determine whether and when further discovery should be 
allowed. 
 Appoint third parties such as neutral experts or special masters 
to assist the court, if necessary, given the nature of a particular 
action or as agreed by the parties, to monitor discovery and 
ensure that proportionate discovery is conducted. 
 Consider phasing discovery to encourage cooperation and 
reasonable disclosure. 
There are a myriad of other cases and articles addressing these 
issues. Obviously, there is no hard and fast rule, and the inquiry 
remains factually based involving a case-by-case determination.113 
VI. COMPETENT REPRESENTATION IN E-DISCOVERY 
As noted at the outset of this article, the issues that arise in 
electronic discovery are evolving as rapidly as the technology. 
Nonetheless, the basic rules of civil procedure and conduct of 
discovery still control the landscape, as well as consideration of all 
ethical mandates. It is no longer acceptable to abdicate all 
responsibility for electronic discovery to litigation support staff. 
The decisions that are inherent in the process of electronic 
discovery require the expertise and judgment of attorneys. By 
taking an active and meaningful role in the process, attorneys can 
best protect and represent the interests of their clients and ensure 
that their handling of electronic discovery conforms to all 
applicable rules of professional conduct. Minnesota Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent representation 
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”114 
It is important to note that the competency requirement is 
held by counsel and cannot be abdicated to support staff. Counsel 
must possess enough knowledge to be able to effectively supervise 
 
 113.  See infra Appendix B for further resources. 
 114.  MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012). 
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those that they oversee. This obligation has also been explicitly 
extended to the handling of metadata in documents by the 
Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Opinion 
No. 22.115 
The ABA’s recently adopted comment to Rule 1.1 regarding 
competence states, “To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, 
a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, 
including the benefits and risks associated with technology, engage in 
continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal 
education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”116 
Further, Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 
establishes similar, although not identical obligations to those 
established under ABA Rule 3.4 regarding access to evidence and 
documents. Minnesota Rule 3.4 states that a lawyer shall not 
“unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or 
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material 
having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or 
assist another person to do any such act.”117 
The clear mandate as articulated by both the Federal and the 
Minnesota Rules establishes that counsel can no longer take a 
passive approach to e-discovery. The rules require that all counsel 
understand technology to the extent necessary to effectively 
advance their clients’ interests. 
VII. MALPRACTICE ISSUES 
The law regarding malpractice cases for e-discovery missteps is 
just beginning to develop. We can expect to see cases, however, as 
more decisions are issued about the failure to issue litigation holds 
and preserve relevant data. Cases addressing an attorney’s failure to 
properly supervise preservation of ESI and properly respond to 
requests for e-discovery could, under the right circumstances, be 
negligent and conceivably could form the basis for a malpractice 
claim.118 Professional negligence may result from acts of 
 
 115.  See Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., Op. 22 (2010), available at 
2010 WL 7378367 (discussing a lawyer’s ethical obligations regarding metadata). 
 116.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 117.  MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a). 
 118.  See, e.g., Complaint at 4–5, J-M Mfg. Co. v. McDermott Will & Emery, No. 
BC462832 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 2, 2011), 2011 WL 2296468 (providing an 
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commission as well as acts of omission. Actions such as instructing a 
client to alter their social media site, failing to handle data in a 
manner that insures preservation of metadata, exaggerating the 
costs of collection of data,119 and many other actions could well give 
rise to claims of malpractice. Failing to give a client clear direction 
to preserve data can be just as culpable as advising a client to 
destroy data, and both acts may leave counsel vulnerable to claims 
of malpractice.120 Thus, it is important for practitioners to be well 
versed in the ever-changing world of e-discovery. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
E-discovery is technology driven, and as technology evolves, so 
does e-discovery. Nevertheless, and despite the ever-changing 
landscape, every lawyer handling litigation must have a familiarity 
and skill in dealing with ESI and e-discovery. Courts are less and 
less willing to be sympathetic to the tired refrain that a lawyer or 
party did not understand what was required. And courts in 
Minnesota have imposed a variety of sanctions in various cases in 
their efforts to force parties and litigants to learn the e-discovery 
basics. Thus, the establishment of and adherence to best practices 
in this area will aid both the bench and the bar.  
 
example of where a client asserted claims for legal malpractice and breach of 
fiduciary duty regarding improper production of privileged electronic 
documents). 
 119.  See Starbucks Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 08-cv-900-JCC, 2009 WL 
4730798, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009). 
 120.  See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 255 F.R.D. 135 (D. Del. 
2009) (“[B]ecause the document retention policy was discussed and adopted 
within the context of Rambus’ litigation strategy, the court [found] that Rambus 
knew, or should have known, that a general implementation of the policy was 
inappropriate because the documents destroyed would become material at some 
point in the future.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(noting that “Attorney Johnson advised Rambus to initiate” a document retention 
policy that required Attorney Vincent to conform outside counsel’s patent files in 
a way that resulted in the destruction of some of the prosecuting attorney’s 
documents without providing Vincent “with guidelines . . . as to what sorts of 
documents to discard”), vacated, 645 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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APPENDIX A 
MINN. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) (Competence): 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B–C): 
(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A party 
need not provide discovery of electronically stored information 
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery 
or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought 
must show that the information is not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court 
may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the 
requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the 
discovery. 
(C) When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must 
limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by 
these rules or by local rule if it determines that: 
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity 
to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or 
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, 
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s note (1983 amendment) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted): 
Rule 26(g) imposes an affirmative duty to engage in pretrial 
discovery in a responsible manner that is consistent with the spirit and 
purposes of Rules 26 through 37. In addition, Rule 26(g) is designed 
to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition of 
sanctions. The subdivision provides a deterrent to both excessive 
discovery and evasion by imposing a certification requirement that 
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obliges each attorney to stop and think about the legitimacy of a 
discovery request, a response thereto, or an objection. . . . 
If primary responsibility for conducting discovery is to 
continue to rest with the litigants, they must be obliged to act 
responsibly and avoid abuse. With this in mind, Rule 26(g), which 
parallels the amendments to Rule 11, requires an attorney or 
unrepresented party to sign each discovery request, response, or 
objection. . . . 
Although the certification duty requires the lawyer to pause and 
consider the reasonableness of his request, response, or objection, it is not 
meant to discourage or restrict necessary and legitimate discovery. 
The rule simply requires that the attorney make a reasonable 
inquiry into the factual basis of his response, request, or objection. 
The duty to make a “reasonable inquiry” is satisfied if the 
investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions 
drawn therefrom are reasonable under the circumstances. It is an 
objective standard similar to the one imposed by Rule 11. . . . 
. . . . 
Concern about discovery abuse has led to widespread 
recognition that there is a need for more aggressive judicial control 
and supervision. Sanctions to deter discovery abuse would be more 
effective if they were diligently applied “not merely to penalize 
those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, 
but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the 
absence of such a deterrent.” 
MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02 (emphasis added): 
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance 
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
. . . . 
(b) Scope and Limits. . . . 
. . . . 
(2) . . . A party need not provide discovery of electron-
ically stored information from sources that the party 
identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a 
protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought 
must show that the information is not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, 
the court may nonetheless order discovery from such 
sources if the requesting party shows good cause, 
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considering the limitations of Rule 26.02(b)(3). The court 
may specify conditions for the discovery. 
(3) . . . The frequency or extent of use of the discovery 
methods otherwise permitted under these rules shall be 
limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery 
sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is 
obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the 
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; 
or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs 
of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in 
resolving the issues. The court may act on its own initiative 
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under rule 
26.03. 
On February 4, 2013, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued an 
order adopting amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the General Rules of Practice relating to the Civil 
Justice Reform Task Force. These changes were effective on July 1, 
2013 and are available at: Order Nos. ADM10-8051, ADM09-8009, 
ADM04-8001, Order Promulgating Corrective Amendments to the 
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The Sedona Conference Commentary on: Preservation, Management and 
Identification of Sources of Information That Are Not Reasonably 




1 Active on-line data Hard drives, PDAs, network storage




Removable optical disks or magnetic tape media which 
can be labeled and stored in a shelf or rack
4 Backup tapes 
Sequential access devices typically not organized for 




Damaged CDs or DVDs that cannot be read by an 
ordinary drive or damaged hard drives and tapes 
6 Legacy media 
Difficult or impossible to locate a compatible drive or 




Web pages constantly being deleted and overwritten to 
make room for further storage
8 Hidden complexity 
Deleted files after recycle bin has been emptied which 









Cache and temp files created by a PC difficult to 
preserve without disabling operating system




Numbers of PDA devices needed to be reviewed for 
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APPENDIX B 
Cases: 
 Cost shifting: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake III), 
216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 Spoliation: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake IV), 220 
F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 Sanctions for spoliation: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. 
(Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 Document preservation: Compare Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135, 
161–62 (2d Cir. 2012), which found that the approach in Orbit 
One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 441 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) to consider the failure to adopt good 
preservations practices was one factor in determining whether 
sanctions should issue is “the better approach,” with Pension 
Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
L.L.C., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), which 
held that the sanctions were justified because the plaintiffs 
failed to “act diligently and search thoroughly after they 
reasonably anticipated litigation” and the duty to preserve 
electronic records had been triggered. See also Rimkus 
Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010). 
Resources: 
 The Sedona Conference, 
https://thesedonaconference.org/publications. 
 The Sedona Conference Commentary on: Preservation, Management 
and Identification of Sources of Information That Are Not 
Reasonably Accessible, SEDONA CONF. (July 2008), 
https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/66. 
 The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on 
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 155 
(2013). 
 The Sedona Canada Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic 
Disclosure & Discovery, SEDONA CONF. (Oct. 2010), 
https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/468. 
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 The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation: Resources 
for the Judiciary, SEDONA CONF. (Aug. 2011), 
https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/425. 
 Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: 
By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789 (2010). 
 Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, Note, Cost-Shifting in ESI 
Discovery Disputes: A Five Factor Test to Promote Consistency and Set 
Party Expectations, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 569 (2009). 
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